THE REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT--BREAKING UP (OR BREAKING OFF) IS HARD TO DO: WHY THE RIGHT TO  LIQUIDATION  DOES NOT GUARANTEE A FORCED SALE UPON DISSOLUTION OF THE PARTNERSHIP by Hixson, Tiffany A.
Western New England Law Review
Volume 31 31 (2009)




THE REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP
ACT--BREAKING UP (OR BREAKING OFF) IS
HARD TO DO: WHY THE RIGHT TO
"LIQUIDATION" DOES NOT GUARANTEE A
FORCED SALE UPON DISSOLUTION OF
THE PARTNERSHIP
Tiffany A. Hixson
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Review & Student Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England
University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Western New England Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons
@ Western New England University School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.
Recommended Citation
Tiffany A. Hixson, THE REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT--BREAKING UP (OR BREAKING OFF) IS HARD TO DO:
WHY THE RIGHT TO "LIQUIDATION" DOES NOT GUARANTEE A FORCED SALE UPON DISSOLUTION OF THE
PARTNERSHIP, 31 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 797 (2009), http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview/vol31/iss3/13
NOTES 

THE REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT-BREAKING 
Up (OR BREAKING OFF) Is HARD To Do: WHY THE RIGHT TO 
"LIQUIDATION" DOES NOT GUARANTEE A FORCED SALE UPON 
DISSOLUTION OF THE PARTNERSHIP 
"A partnership, like a marriage, often is far easier to start than it is 
to end."1 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1914, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni­
form State Laws (the Conference) presented the states with a Uni­
form Partnership Act (UPA).2 UPA provided a blanket set of rules 
governing all aspects of a general partnership, including a partner's 
withdrawal, in the absence of a partnership agreemenP Because 
UPA's provisions governing a partner's withdrawal were modeled 
on the aggregate theory,4 the departure of any partner from the 
partnership marked the legal end of that partnership.5 When one 
partner withdrew from a partnership-at-will, the partnership assets 
were sold. The surplus was distributed to the partners regardless of 
1. Donald J. Weidner & John W. Larson, The Revised Uniform Partnership Act: 
The Reporters' Overview, 49 Bus. LAW. 1,7 (1993) [hereinafter Reporters' Overview]. 
2. UNIF. P'SHIP Aer, at prefatory note (amended 1997),6 U.L.A. 5 (2001). 
3. ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON 
PARTNERSHIP § 1.02 (1988 & Supp. 2007). 
4. Under the aggregate theory, the partnership is viewed "[a]s a collection of sole 
proprietors engaged in the same business. For example, where one or another general 
partner is held fully liable for any obligation of the partnership, the partnership is being 
treated as an aggregation of individuals." BURTON J. DEFREN, PARTNERSHIP DESK 
BOOK 103 (1978). This theory is reflected in the UPA's definition of partnership as "an 
association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit." 
UNIF. P'SHIP Aer § 6(1) (1914), 6 U.L.A. 393 (2001). For a discussion of the aggregate 
theory and two other theories of partnerShip, the entity theory and the functional ap­
proach to partnership, see generally Gary S. Rosin, The Entity-Aggregate Dispute: Con­
ceptualism and Functionalism in Partnership Law, 42 ARK. L. REv. 395 (1989). 
5. UNIF. P'SHIP Aer § 38(1) (1914); UNIF. P'SHIP Aer § 801 cmt. 1 (amended 
1997); see also UNIF. P'SHIP Aer § 29 (1914). 
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the event that caused the dissolution, provided that the dissolution 
was not "in contravention of the partnership agreement."6 
At first, because of UPA's aggregate basis, some courts prohib­
ited a buyout7 and required a forced sales of assets following disso­
lution of the partnership.9 However, the prevailing view among 
jurisdictions that adopted UPA was to recognize a "common law 
gloss"lo to the liquidation provision, effectively permitting the re­
maining partners to buyout the withdrawing partner's interest.ll 
These courts relied on the statutory language of UPA, which merely 
guaranteed a dissociating partner his interest in cash.l2 Further 
support for the common law gloss came from UPA's acknowledge­
ment of the courts' power to supplement the Act through their eq­
uitable discretion. l3 
In 1992, the Conference proposed a Revised Uniform Partner­
ship Act (RUPA) to replace UPA.14 RUPA contains many of the 
same provisions as UPA but is based on the entity theory,15 which 
provides two distinct pathways for partnership dissociation and dis­
6. See UNIF. P'SHIP Acr § 38(1) (1914). Dissolution is defined as "the change in 
the relation of the partners caused by any partner ceasing to be associated in the carry­
ing on as distinguished from the winding up of the business." Id. § 29. 
7. A buyout is "[t]he purchase of all or a controlling percentage of the assets ... 
of a business." BLACK'S LAW DICfIONARY 213 (8th ed. 1999). In this Note, the term 
"buyout" is used to refer to the purchase by a non-withdrawing partner or partners. 
8. A forced sale is defined as "[a] hurried sale by a debtor because of financial 
hardship or a creditor's action." Id. at 1365. A forced sale typically results in reduced 
prices because there is no time to find a willing buyer. 
9. See Davis v. Davis, 366 P.2d 857, 859 (Colo. 1961); Polikoff v. Levy, 270 N.E.2d 
540, 547 (Ill. App. Ct. 1971); Young v. Cooper, 203 S.W.2d 376, 386 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
1947). 
10. The "common law gloss" was an equitable interpretation of UPA section 
38(1) whereby the courts recognized that a forced sale was not required in every case of 
partnership dissolution. See BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 3, § 7.11(f). 
11. Id. For cases holding that a forced sale is not required under the UPA, see 
Logoluso v. Logoluso, 43 Cal. Rptr. 678, 682 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Nicholes v. 
Hunt, 541 P.2d 820, 828-29 (Or. 1975); Guntle v. Barnett, 871 P.2d 627 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1994). 
12. See UNIF. P'SHIP Acr § 38(1) (1914),6 U.L.A. 487 (2001); see also Guntle, 871 
P.2d at 627 (holding that under UPA, a buyout is permissible so long as the dissociating 
partner receives the value of his interest in cash). 
13. See UNIF. P'SHIP Acr § 5 (1914) (acknowledging that the rules of law and 
equity supplement the Act). 
14. UNIF. P'SHIP Acr, at prefatory note (amended 1997),6 U.L.A. 5 (2001). Al­
though RUPA was promulgated in 1992, it was amended in 1993, 1994, 1996, and 1997. 
Id. 
15. The entity theory sees the partnership as a legal person. Rosin, supra note 4, 
at 398. 
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solution.16 Certain events, such as death of a partner, trigger 
RUPA's dissociation pathwayP Upon dissociation, the partnership 
does not dissolve but continues according to the entity theory.I8 As 
such, the partnership must buyout the deceased partner's interest 
and continue the partnership business.19 
On the other hand, RUPA's dissolution pathway is triggered by 
certain events including a judicial decree or, in the case of a part­
nership-at-will, the express will of a partner to withdraw.20 Follow­
ing either of these events, the partnership begins the winding-up 
process, during which the assets of the partnership are sold.21 In 
terms of both statutory language and result, the effect of RUPA 
dissolution is identical to UPA dissolution.22 
Despite RUPA's adherence to the entity theory and the simi­
larities between RUPA and UPA dissolution, some courts have held 
that dissolution under RUPA requires a forced sale of all partner­
ship assets.23 They mistakenly interpret the plain language of the 
statute to require a forced sale and prohibit a buyout by the remain­
ing partners.24 Moreover, using a faulty negative implication argu­
ment, they assert that because RUPA's dissociation pathway 
provides for a mandatory buyout, it precludes a buyout of any kind 
when the partnership proceeds down the dissolution pathway.25 
16. UNIF. P'SHIP Aer, at prefatory note (amended 1997). 
17. Id. § 601(7)(i). 
18. See id. § 601 cmt. 1 ("The entity theory of partnership provides a conceptual 
basis for continuing the firm itself despite a partner's withdrawal from the firm."). 
19. Id. § 701(a); see also id. § 603 cmt. 1 ("[A] partner's dissociation will always 
result in either a buyout ... or a dissolution and winding up of the business."). 
20. See id. § 801(1), (5). 
21. See id. §§ 801, 807. 
22. Compare id. § 807(a) (The procedures for settling accounts under RUPA re­
quire that "the assets of the partnership ... be applied to discharge its obligations to 
creditors ... , [and a]ny surplus ... be applied to pay in cash the net amount distributa­
ble to partners ...." (emphasis added)), with UNIF. P'SHIP Aer § 38(1) (1914), 6 
U.L.A. 487 (2001) (Upon dissolution, the partners "may have the partnership property 
applied to discharge its liabilities, and the surplus applied to pay in cash the net amount 
owing to the respective partners." (emphasis added)). 
23. See, e.g., McCormick v. Brevig, 96 P.3d 697, 704 (Mont. 2004) (construing 
Montana's codified version of RUPA section 807 to require a forced sale upon dissolu­
tion of the partnership); Pankratz Farms, Inc. v. Pankratz, 95 P.3d 671, 680-81 (Mont. 
2004) (interpreting Montana's version of RUPA section 807 to require a forced sale 
upon judicial dissolution despite negative tax consequences and applicant's alternative 
request for monetary damages). 
24. See McCormick, 96 P.3d at 704; Pankratz Farms, Inc., 95 P.3d at 680-81. 
25. See McCormick, 96 P.3d at 703 (explaining that a buyout is only permissible 
where there has been a dissociation); see also BROMBERG & RrBSTEIN, supra note 3, 
§ 7.11(f). 
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Lastly, these courts fail to exercise their own equitable discretion to 
allow one partner to buyout the other even though such judicial 
power is expressly granted in the ACt.26 
Part I of this Note will provide a history of both UPA and 
RUPA and will discuss the differences and similarities between the 
two acts as well as the policy reasons behind them. Part II of this 
Note will discuss some of the cases considering whether RUPA re­
quires a forced sale upon winding up, focusing on the different in­
terpretations of the statutory language. Part II will specifically 
examine the courts' different meanings of the term "liquidation." 
Part III will argue that RUPA does not require a forced sale. 
This is not to say that a buyout is necessary or mandated in all 
cases. The argument, rather, is that courts should consider a buyout 
as an alternative to a forced sale when implementing RUPA's disso­
lution provision. The rationale for this argument will include an 
examination of the statutory language, which, as in UPA, only guar­
antees a partner the right to receive his interest in cash. Further 
support for this position will rely on the entity nature of the part­
nership under RUPA. Because RUPA is modeled on the entity the­
ory and not the aggregate theory, the partnership exists as a legal 
entity despite one partner's withdrawal from the firm. Part III will 
also present a counterargument to the interpretation that RUPA 
dissociation must preclude a buyout by negative implication. Be­
cause RUPA dissociation only provides for a mandatory buyout, 
the court is not prohibited from allowing a voluntary or court­
approved buyout when partners seek dissolution. Lastly, Part III 
will argue that the term "liquidation" as used in the statute is am­
biguous at best. As a result, courts are free to defer to their equita­
ble powers and permit a buyout. 




As early as 1902, the drafters of UPA were "split on philosoph­
ical grounds" over which theory, aggregate or entity, would provide 
26. Cf Inv. Mgmt., Inc. v. Jordan Realty, Inc., No. C3-0l-2162, 2002 WL 1751259, 
at *7 (Minn. Ct. App. July 30, 2002) ("Using its equitable powers, ... the district court 
chose to preserve the partnership assets of [the partners], rather than ordering those 
assets sold and converted to cash. We do not read [Minnesota's version of RUPA] so 
narrowly as to preclude such a resolution."). 
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the backbone of the actP This split remains a presence throughout 
partnership law. The corresponding question that arises as part of 
this controversy is what RUPA actually retained from UPA, princi­
pally regarding whether RUPA dissolution is synonymous with 
UPA dissolution. This inquiry has particularly strong consequences 
for partners "breaking up with" or "breaking off from" the partner­
ship. An examination of the legislative history suggests that the 
philosophical nature of the acts and their plain language provides 
sufficient backing for both sides of the argument. 
A. The Road to a Uniform Partnership Act 
Common law principles governing partnership emerged in the 
American legal system during the nineteenth century.28 Because of 
confusion surrounding the rights and obligations of partners and 
creditors under common law, codification of partnership law was 
inevitable.29 The establishment of a uniform partnership law in the 
United States began in 1902, when the Conference recognized a 
need for uniformity in partnership law.30 
The road to a uniform partnership act was, however, a long and 
arduous process.31 The death of the original chief draftsman32 and 
27. UPA Revision Subcommittee of the Committee on Partnerships and Unincor­
porated Business Organizations, Should the Uniform Partnership Act Be Revised?, 43 
Bus. LAW. 121, 122 (1987) [hereinafter Committee Report]. 
28. BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 3, § 1.02(b). For a discussion of early 
partnership law, including a historical look at the mercantile idea of partnership, see 
generally THEOPHILUS PARSONS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP (Joseph 
Henry Beale, Jr. ed., Little, Brown & Co. 4th ed. 1893). 
29. BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 3, § 1.02(b). England's Partnership Act 
of 1890 pre-dated most American partnership statutes. See id. Although several states 
enacted statutes that loosely addressed partnership issues during the nineteenth cen­
tury, the events leading to a statutory consolidation in the United States were not set in 
motion until the twentieth century. See id. 
30. UNIF. P'SHIP Aer, at prefatory note (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 5 (2001). The 
Conference is responsible for other uniform acts, including the Negotiable Instruments 
Act of 1896. William Draper Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act, 24 YALE L.J. 617, 
617 (1915). 
31. See generally Lewis, supra note 30 (describing some of the obstacles encoun­
tered while drafting UPA). 
32. Initially, in 1902, the Conference's Committee on Commercial Law (the Com­
mittee) approached James Barr Ames, Dean of Harvard Law School, with the task of 
drafting a uniform partnership act. BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 3, § 1.02(b). 
Ames accepted and worked on drafting the first Uniform Partnership Act until his 
death. UNIF. P'SHIP Aer, at prefatory note (1914),6 U.L.A. 276 (2001). In 1910, Wil­
liam Draper Lewis, Dean of the University of Pennsylvania Law School, took over as 
the expert draftsman. Id. 
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the debate over whether to follow an aggregate33 or entity34 model 
of partnership contributed to a twelve-year drafting process.35 
Before his death, James Barr Ames submitted two drafts to the 
Committee, both adopting the entity theory of partnership.36 In 
contrast, William Draper Lewis, Ames's successor, expressed doubt 
as to whether strict adherence to an entity theory would best clarify 
the law of partnership.37 To aid in the decision, Lewis presented 
two drafts to the Committee: one based on the aggregate theory 
and another based on the entity theory.38 Upon examination and 
assessment of both drafts, the Conference, members of the legal 
profession, and "[p]ractically all teachers and writers on the law of 
partnership in the United States" agreed on the aggregate theory.39 
The result was that UPA, as approved by the Conference in 1914, 
embodied the aggregate theory.40 
33. Under the common law, or aggregate theory, a partnership is defined as "an 
association of two or more persons carrying on business as co-principals." Lewis, supra 
note 30, at 639; see also supra note 4 and accompanying text. Opponents of the aggre­
gate theory argue that it places "too much emphasis on the individual rights of each 
partner, and too little on the collective rights of all the partners." Rosin, supra note 4, 
at 397. 
34. In contrast to the aggregate theory, the entity theory provides that the law 
should regard a partnership as "having a legal personality distinct from the individual 
legal personalities of each partner." Lewis, supra note 30, at 639. The distinction be­
tween the two theories is particularly relevant to the procedures required to continue a 
partnership following the departure of one or more partners. See Committee Report, 
supra note 27, at 124 (equating an increased emphasis on the entity theory with preven­
tion of a technical dissolution upon a buyout by non-dissociating partners). 
35. Lewis, supra note 30, at 639-40. 
36. Id. Dean Ames would have defined partnership as "a legal person formed by 
the association of two or more individuals for the purpose of carrying on business with a 
view to profit." William Draper Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act-A Reply to Mr. 
Crane's Criticism, 29 HARV. L. REV. 158, 165 (1915) (emphasis added). 
37. Lewis, supra note 30, at 640. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. See Rosin, supra note 4, at 401 ("Both the language and history of the UPA 
reflect the adoption of a general aggregate concept of partnerships as associations of 
partners, rather than as separate legal persons."). However, the Conference claims that 
the UPA embodies both theories. See UNIF. P'SHIP Aer, at prefatory note (amended 
1997),6 U.L.A. 5 (2001). But see Donald J. Weidner, Three Policy Decisions Animate 
Revision of Uniform Pannership Act, 46 Bus. LAW. 427, 428-29 (1991) [hereinafter 
Weidner, Three Policy Decisions] ("[T]he extent to which the final product incorporates 
the aggregate as opposed to entity theory is very much in the eye of the beholder."). 
Unlike RUPA, which contains a clear adoption of the entity theory in section 201, UPA 
did not provide such unequivocal guidance. Compare UNIF. P'SHIP Aer § 201 
(amended 1997) ("A partnership is an entity distinct from its partners."), with UNIF. 
P'SHIP Aer § 6 (1914),6 U.L.A. 393 (2001) . Although UPA contains aspects of both 
theories, the dissolution provisions adhere exclusively to an aggregate theory of part­
nership. UNIF. P'SHIP Aer § 801 cmt. 1 (amended 1997) (explaining that UPA section 
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B. The Uniform Partnership Act of 1914 
The appeal of UPA was evidenced by its widespread adoption 
without revision.41 By 1986, UPA had been adopted in every state 
except Louisiana.42 The omnipresence of UPA made it convenient 
to compare cases across jurisdictions.43 This became increasingly 
important as firms did business in more than one state and were led 
by partners living in more than one state.44 UPA provided the 
states with a comprehensive set of rules governing relations of a 
general partnership45 in the absence of an agreement,46 including 
how to end a partnership.47 
In order for a partnership governed by UPA to conclude, "dis­
solution," "winding up," and "termination" must take place in that 
order.48 Despite the definitions provided in UPA, the three terms 
were a constant source of confusion in the legal community due to 
their indiscriminate use by many courts and lawyers.49 Dissolution 
under UPA refers to "the change in the relation of the partners 
caused by any partner ceasing to be associated in the carrying on as 
distinguished from the winding up of the business."5o Dissolution 
can be triggered by, inter alia, "the express will of any partner" in a 
29 was intended to conform to the aggregate theory); Donald J. Weidner, The Revised 
Uniform Partnership Act Midstream: Major Policy Decisions, 21 U. ToL. L. REV. 825, 
836 (1990) [hereinafter Weidner, RUPA Midstream] (Dissolution under RUPA "is an 
aggregate conception that partnership is a unique aggregation of individuals, a specific 
cast of characters. The cast is 'dissolved' whenever anyone leaves."). 
41. Weidner, RUPA Midstream, supra note 40, at 825. 
42. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT, at prefatory note (amended 1997); BROMBERG & RIB­
STEIN, supra note 3, § 1.02(b). 
43. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT, at prefatory note (1914). 
44. See id. 
45. Partnership is defined as "an association of two or more persons to carryon 
as co-owners a business for profit." [d. § 6. 
46. UPA contains both "default" and "mandatory" provisions. Weidner, Three 
Policy Decisions, supra note 40, at 453. Mandatory rules apply in all circumstances 
despite a contrary partnership agreement. Id. A default rule only applies if a partner­
ship agreement does not provide otherwise. [d. At least where default provisions are 
concerned, UPA is best thought of as a "standard form contract" that can be varied by 
the parties through a partnership agreement. BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 3, 
§ 1.02(b). For a discussion on the uncertainty of UPA's default and mandatory rules, 
see Weidner, Three Policy Decisions, supra note 40, at 453 ("It is not completely clear 
which [UPA] rules are default rules and which are mandatory rules."). 
47. BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 3, § 1.02(b). 
48. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT §§ 29-32 (1914); see also Committee Report, supra note 27, 
at 160. 
49. ALAN R. BROMBERG, CRANE AND BROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP 416 (1968). 
50. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 29 (1914). 
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partnership at will,51 "the death of any partner,"52 or the court's 
decree.53 Following dissolution, winding Up54 of the partnership is 
required, and only upon the completion of the winding-up process 
will the partnership terminate.55 
Consistent with UPA's aggregate theory of partnership, the 
withdrawal of any member from a partnership effectively dissolves 
that partnership.56 Even if the remaining members choose to con­
tinue with their former business, they must form a new partnership 
for purposes of UPA.57 Upon the dissolution of a partnership, UPA 
provides that any partner has a right to compel liquidation of part­
nership assets in order to receive his share.58 UPA section 38(1) 
states that a partner "may have the partnership property applied to 
discharge its liabilities, and the surplus applied to pay in cash the 
net amount owing to the respective partners."59 The statutory lim­
its placed on this right only require that dissolution was not caused 
"in contravention of the partnership agreement," that the partner 
was not expelled within the terms of the partnership agreement, 
and that the partnership agreement does not provide otherwise.60 
The right to force liquidation under UPA "refers to the dissoci­
ating partner's right to compel a sale of all the partnership assets at 
an auction."61 This differs from a buyout where "non-dissociating 
partners have the legal right to continue the business if they can 
purchase the interest of the other at an agreed upon or judicially 
51. Id. § 31(1)(b). 
52. Id. § 31(4). 
53. Id. §§ 31(6), 32. 
54. Winding up is "the process of settling partnership affairs after dissolution." 
Id. § 29 cmt.; BROMBERG, supra note 49, at 416. 
55. UNIF. P'SHIP Acr § 30 (1914) ("On dissolution the partnership is not termi­
nated, but continues after the winding up of partnership affairs is completed."); see also 
id. § 29 cmt. ("[Tlermination is the point in time when all the partnership affairs are 
wound up."); BROMBERG, supra note 49, at 416. 
56. UNIF. P'SHIP Acr § 801 cmt. 1 (amended 1997), 6 V.L.A. 190 (2001) ("Under 
the UPA Section 29, a partnership is dissolved every time a partner leaves. That reflects 
the aggregate nature of the partnership under the UPA."). 
57. Id. (Under UPA section 29, "[elven if the business of the partnership is con­
tinued by some of the partners, it is technically a new partnership."). 
58. UNIF. P'SHIP Acr § 38(1) (1914); see also BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 
3, § 7.11(b)(1). 
59. UNIF. P'SHIP Acr § 38(1) (1914); see, e.g., Dreifuerst v. Dreifuerst, 280 
N.W.2d 335, 339 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that the right to liquidation under sec­
tion 38(1) gives a partner the right to order a forced sale). 
60. UNIF. P'SHIP Acr § 38(1) (1914); see also BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 
3, § 7.11(b)(1). 
61. Larry E. Ribstein, A Statutory Approach to Partner Dissociation, 65 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 357, 367 (1987). 
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determined price. "62 Even though the text of section 38(1) pro­
vides for a liquidation right over a buyout option,63 courts have tra­
ditionally adhered to a common law principle permitting buyout.64 
In fact, many courts insist that 
[c]onstruing together pertinent provisions of the statute leads to 
the conclusion that it was not the intention of the legislature in 
the enactment of the Uniform Partnership Act to impose a 
mandatory requirement that, under all circumstances, the assets 
of a dissolved partnership shall be sold and the money received 
therefor divided among those entitled to it, particularly ... where 
there are no debts to be paid from the proceeds.65 
In order to align this common law rule with UPA section 38, 
some courts reach the conclusion that a buyout is permissible in 
almost all circumstances so long as the departing party receives his 
interest in cash.66 This insistence on the "in cash" rule generally 
62. Id. at 367-68 (explaining that the difference between liquidation and a buyout 
is the remaining partners' right of first refusal where a business is purchased as a going 
concern). A similar buyout definition exists in section 38(2)(c)(II) where the Act ex­
pressly provides for the buyout of a partner who wrongfully caused the dissolution 
when all other partners agree to continue the partnership business. See UNIF. P'SHIP 
ACT § 38(2)(c)(II) (1914). 
63. For cases in which courts interpreted UPA to forbid a buyout and require a 
forced sale, see Davis v. Davis, 366 P.2d 857 (Colo. 1961); Polikoff v. Levy, 270 N.E.2d 
540 (Ill. App. Ct. 1971); Young v. Cooper, 203 S.W.2d 376 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1947). For a 
criticism of the liquidation right under UPA, as well as liquidation rights in general, see 
ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, SPECIAL RELEASE ON THE REVISED UNI. 
FORM PARNTERSHIP ACT: BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP 106-07 (1993). 
Bromberg and Ribstein criticize the liquidation right because: 
[a]s a practical matter, the liquidation right puts the whole group at the mercy 
of an individual partner who can time the call to facilitate a takeover of the 
firm at an advantageous price . 
. . . [T]he UPA drafters probably did not consider carefully the costs of 
the liquidation right. Whatever the UPA drafters thought, 80 years of the 
UPA have demonstrated the inappropriateness of the liquidation right as indi­
cated by the standard practice of drafting around the right and the judicial 
decisions that have found some way to qualify it. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
64. BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 3, § 7.11(f); see supra note 10 and accom­
panying text. For cases holding that under UPA, a forced sale is not required, see Logo­
luso v. Logoluso, 43 Cal. Rptr. 678 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Nicholes v. Hunt, 541 
P.2d 820 (Or. 1975); Guntle v. Barnett, 871 P.2d 627 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994). 
65. Rinke v. Rinke, 48 N.W.2d 201, 207 (Mich. 1951); see also Nicholes, 541 P.2d 
at 828 (quoting Rinke, 48 N.W.2d at 207). 
66. See, e.g., Guntle, 871 P.2d at 632 (explaining that since the language of UPA 
only requires the dissociating partner to receive the value of his interest in cash, a 
buyout may be permitted). 
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allows for a buyout but distinctly prohibits distribution in kind67 ab­
sent consent of the partners.68 
A court's willingness to permit a buyout stems from equitable 
concerns that liquidation "[will] result in a loss of value because of 
the nature of the asset, current market conditions, or the costs and 
risks of sale."69 Statutory support for the court's equitable discre­
tion comes from section 5 of UPA, which states that the principles 
of law and equity supplement the act.7° Specifically, a buyout is 
appropriate where it reduces economic waste by avoiding adminis­
trative costs associated with a public sale.71 For example, in Disotell 
v. Stiltner, the court allowed a buyout because expenses relating to 
a public sale of the real estate would have cost as much as twelve 
percent of the property's total value.72 Likewise, a buyout insulates 
partners from the risk of receiving an unfairly low price at a public 
sale.73 When this risk presents itself, "partners are frequently the 
best prospects for purchase ... [because of their] knowledge of the 
business, experience in its operations, and, perhaps, confidence in 
its future."74 
Opponents of buyouts argue that a private sale does not pro­
vide partners with the fair market value of the assets because of the 
prospect of a higher return at a public auction.75 While this argu­
ment is not without merit, the concern for fair market value can be 
partially eliminated by ordering judicial supervision of the sale to 
ensure a fair price.76 In addition, a buyout is an effective counter­
67. In-kind distributions are generally avoided because: (1) they would "present 
difficult valuation problems"; (2) they would tend to perpetuate majority partners' bar­
gaining power; and (3) they may give rise to yet another form of concurrent ownership. 
Reporters' Overview, supra note 1, at 9-10. 
68. Guntle,871 P.2d at 632. Guntle declared that upon dissolution under UPA, a 
partner has the right to receive cash for his partnership interest and cannot be forced to 
accept distribution in kind. See id.; see also UNIF. P'SHIP Acr § 38 cmt. (1914), 6 
U.L.A. 487 (2001) (expressly acknowledging a partner's right to receive his interest in 
cash). But see Logoluso, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 682 (permitting distribution in kind absent 
great prejudice to the parties). 
69. BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 3, § 7.11(f) (footnotes omitted). 
70. UNIF. P'SHIP Acr § 5 (1914) ("In any case not provided for in this act the 
rules of law and equity, including the law merchant, shaH govern."). 
71. Disotell v. Stiltner, 100 P.3d 890, 894 (Alaska 2004). 
72. Id. 
73. See Nicholes v. Hunt, 541 P.2d 820, 827-28 (Or. 1975). 
74. Id. at 827 (citation omitted). 
75. See Ribstein, supra note 61, at 386 n.97. 
76. Id. at 386-87. It is worth noting that RUPA's dissociation provisions safe­
guard against an unfairly low buyout price by valuing the assets without regard to dis­
tress sale circumstances. See UNIF. P'SHIP Acr § 701 cmt. 3 (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 
177 (2001). Thus, under RUPA a departing partner may actually receive more money 
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balance to the risk of exploitation brought on by a right to liquid a­
tion,77 where a dissociated partner may compel liquidation simply 
to freeze out other partners and appropriate the partnership busi­
ness for herself at less than fair market value.78 
C. Problems with UPA 
As partnership law developed over the next seventy-five years, 
general partnerships began to outgrow UPA.79 Vast changes in the 
magnitude of partnerships and the rebirth of limited partnerships80 
in the 1970s required that the Conference reconsider both old and 
new problems with UPA.81 In 1986, pressure from the American 
Bar Association (ABA) prompted the Conference to issue a de­
tailed report recommending revisions to UPA.82 The main goal of 
the Committee Report was to determine whether desired changes 
to UPA were so extensive as to require a completely new act or if 
amendments would suffice.83 Among the problems that resurfaced 
during the examination was the dispute between the entity and ag­
gregate theories of partnership that had been present during the 
first drafting of UPA.84 There was also the issue of UPA's failure to 
from allowing another partner to buyout his interest than he would from insisting on a 
forced sale. 
77. Ribstein, supra note 61, at 380-92 (weighing the benefits and costs of a buyout 
right and concluding that partners would likely agree to a buyout right if they were to 
draft their own partnership agreement). 
78. See Disotell v. Stiltner, 100 P.3d 890, 894 (Alaska 2004) (holding that a buyout 
is appropriate where "[l]iquidation exposed [the defendant] to the risk that no buyer 
would offer to pay fair market value for the property"). 
79. Weidner, RUPA Midstream, supra note 40, at 825-27 (arguing that partner­
ship law has been influenced by federal income tax law, federal securities law, and 
bankruptcy law, all of which have undergone substantial changes over the past seventy­
five years while partnership law has remained essentially the same). 
80. A limited partnership is "an entity, having one or more general partners and 
one or more limited partners, which is formed under [the Uniform Limited Partnership 
Act] by two or more persons ...." UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT § 102(11), 6A U.L.A. 359 
(2008). In some situations a limited partnership is favored over a general partnership 
because it provides limited partners with the tax benefits of a general partnership and 
the limited liability of a corporation. JOSEPH SHADE, BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS IN A 
NUTSHELL 33 (2d ed. 2006). 
81. The Committee established a subcommittee in April 1984 for purposes of re­
viewing UPA and recommending changes to the Conference. Committee Report, supra 
note 27, at 122; Weidner, RUPA Midstream, supra note 40, at 825-26. 
82. See generally Committee Report, supra note 27. 
83. Id. at 122. 
84. Id. at 124 (stressing the importance of incorporating the entity theory into a 
revision of UPA whenever possible); Weidner, Three Policy Decisions, supra note 40, at 
429 ("Seventy-five years later, the consensus seems to be that a revised UPA should 
more directly adopt an entity model."). 
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provide explicit language specifying which provisions were 
mandatory and which were default.85 Finally, the issue of dissolu­
tion once again emerged as a logical result of the watershed be­
tween the entity and the aggregate theories.86 Drafters of RUPA 
initially sought to completely eliminate the word "dissolution" from 
the act.87 However, it was reinstated at the eleventh hour due to 
tax concerns88 and the fear that there might be strong opposition to 
the act if the term were omitted.89 
85. See Weidner, Three Policy Decisions, supra note 40, at 453. Donald J. Weid­
ner, the Reporter for the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, commented on the uncer­
tainty concerning UPA default provisions: 
The UPA has a wide range of provisions that govern the rights and obliga­
tions among partners. It is not completely clear which of these rules are de­
fault rules and which are mandatory rules .... 
Some but not all of the UPA rules governing the relations among partners 
state that they are "subject to" a contrary agreement. ... There are ... other 
provisions governing the relations among partners that do not expressly state 
they are subject to contrary agreement. Does expressio unius est exclusio alter­
ius, the maxim of statutory construction, require or at least suggest that the 
remaining rules in the UPA are mandatory because they lack qualifying 
language? 
Id. 
86. See id. at 435. Courts' inconsistent treatment of dissolution over the years 
suggests uncertainty as to its meaning and application: 
Seventy-five years later the law of partnership is still couched in terms of dis­
solution and is still confused. There are cases that find a dissolution and apply 
the strict logic of dissolution even though justice seems to require otherwise. 
There are cases that struggle to reach a right result by refusing to find a disso­
lution even though the statute seems to require a dissolution. More basically, 
there are cases that appear to reflect a complete misunderstanding of the con­
cept of dissolution as it is used in the statute. 
Id. at 435-36 (footnotes omitted). Lewis believed dissolution was "perfectly logical but 
sadly misunderstood." Id. at 435. 
87. Id. at 448. 
88. General partnerships provide advantageous tax treatment to their partners by 
allowing for pass-through taxation. SHADE, supra note 80, at 31. This means that indi­
vidual partners pay taxes only on the partnership income they receive. Id. The partner­
ship itself is not a taxable entity. Id. This essentially gives a tax break to partners who 
have yet to realize a return on their investment. The Committee was concerned that 
recommended changes to UPA, particularly a change to the aggregate nature, may re­
duce or eliminate pass-through taxation because the partnership would be viewed as a 
separate legal (taxable) entity. Committee Report, supra note 27, at 124. The inclusion 
of the term "dissolution" in RUPA al1eviated some of these concerns. 
89. Weidner, Three Policy Decisions, supra note 40, at 448. Weidner jokingly re­
fers to "dissolution" as "the D word." Id. He objected vehemently to the inclusion of 
"the D word" because he felt that "[c]ontinued use of the word is likely to generate 
confusion for two reasons: (i) it always has; and (ii) RUPA now defines dissolution in a 
very different way than it has been defined for over 75 years." Id. at 452. 
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After reviewing the act, the Committee Report recommended 
one hundred and fifty changes to UPA.9o Many of the proposed 
changes were borrowed from Georgia's partnership act, which had 
undergone revision in 1984.91 Among the changes were sixty-six 
proposed revisions to the dissolution provisions of UPA.92 Because 
of the expanse of the prescribed changes and the transformation to 
a different legal theory, specifically the shift from aggregate to en­
tity, the Committee suggested a comprehensive revision of UPA.93 
In 1987, the Committee named a new drafting committee, which 
presented the first draft two years later.94 
In 1992, RUPA was approved by a unanimous vote of the 
states.95 However, drafting errors and objections by the ABA evi­
denced the act's flaws, and it soon required another round of revi­
sions.96 Attempts to salvage the act led to revisions in 1993, 1994, 
1996, and 1997, culminating with the 1997 version of RUPA.97 This 
constant flux of amendments and changes effectively destroyed the 
legislative uniformity enjoyed under UPA.98 Wyoming, Montana, 
and Texas adopted the 1992 version of RUPA,99 whereas Connecti­
cut, Florida, and West Virginia adopted variations on the 1994 ver­
sion. IOO As of May 2008, only thirty-seven states had enacted 
versions of RUPA.101 As such, the advantage of cross-state com­
parisons, which had existed under UPA, has diminished. 
90. See Committee Report, supra note 27, at 124. 
91. Weidner, RUPA Midstream, supra note 40, at 826; see also GA. CODE ANN. 
§§ 14-8-1 to -43 (1984 & Supp. 1987). 
92. Specifically, these changes were in regards to UPA sections 29-42. Committee 
Report, supra note 27, at 125. 
93. Id. at 184. 
94. UNIF. P'SHIP Aer, at prefatory note (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 5 (2001); 
Weidner, RUPA Midstream, supra note 40, at 826. 
95. UNIF. P'SHIP Aer, at prefatory note (amended 1997). 
96. Thomas R. Hurst, Will the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (1994) Ever Be 
Uniformly Adopted?, 48 FLA. L. REv. 575, 578 (1996). 
97. UNIF. P'SHIP Aer, at prefatory note (amended 1997). 
98. See Hurst, supra note 96, at 578 ("As of early 1997, it appears probable that 
the era of uniformity in the law of general partnerships is coming to a close."). 
99. Id.; see also MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-10-101 to -710 (2007); TEX. REV. CIV. 
STAT. ANN. art. 6132(b), §§ 1.01-11.04 (1970 & Supp. 2008) (Texas made substantial 
revisions to the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (1992) before enactment); WYO. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 17-21-101 to -1003 (2007). 
100. Hurst, supra note 96, at 578; see also CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 34-300 to -434 
(2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 620.81001-.9902 (2007); W. VA. CODE ANN §§ 47B-1-1 to ­
11-5 (2006). 
101. See UNIF. P'SHIP Aer (amended 1997) (listing thirty-seven jurisdictions, in­
cluding the District of Columbia, that have adopted a version of RUPA). 
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D. Highlights of Major Changes Made by RUPA 
The differences between RUPA and UPA are best understood 
within the framework of "three policy decisions"lo2 considered 
throughout the drafting process: 
First, RUPA makes a major move away from the aggregate or 
conduit theory of partnerships and toward the entity theory of 
partnerships. Second, RUPA rewrites the rules on partnership 
breakups and in the process gives more stability to partnerships. 
Third, RUPA reflects the supremacy of the partnership agree­
ment and minimizes mandatory rules among partners.103 
Specifically, section 201 of RUPA expressly commits to the en­
tity theory by stating that "[a] partnership is an entity distinct from 
its partners."104 This modification has substantial effects on the dis­
sociation process.1°5 Instead of necessarily requiring a new partner­
ship to be formed every time a partner dissociates, RUPA allows 
the partnership to continue as a going concern.106 
RUPA clarifies the discrepancy that existed under UPA regard­
ing which provisions were default and which were mandatory. Sec­
tion 103(b) lists the provisions that may not be waived or varied by 
a partnership agreement.107 As a matter of policy, RUPA reflects 
102. The phrase "three policy decisions" comes from Weidner's article describing 
the general approach to revision. See generally Weidner, Three Policy Decisions, supra 
note 40, at 427-28. 
103. Id. at 428. 
104. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 201(a) (amended 1997). 
105. Id. § 601 cmt. 1 ("The entity theory of partnership provides a conceptual 
basis for continuing the firm itself despite a partner's withdrawal from the firm."). For 
a discussion on the effects of the entity theory on RUPA's breakup provisions as dis­
cussed during drafting, see generally Weidner, Three Policy Decisions, supra note 40, at 
431-32; Reporters' Overview, supra note 1, at 3-16. 
106. See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 201 cmt. 6 (amended 1997) ("Under RUPA, there is 
no 'new' partnership just because of membership changes."). "Going concern" is de­
fined as "[a] commercial enterprise actively engaging in business with the expectation of 
indefinite continuance." BLACK'S, supra note 7, at 712. 
107. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 103(b) (amended 1997). Section 103(b) of RUPA pro­
vides in pertinent part: 
The partnership agreement may not: 
(6) vary the power to dissociate as a partner under Section 602(a), except 
to require the notice under Section 601(1) to be in writing; 
(7) vary the right of a court to expel a partner in the events specified in 
Section 601(5); 
(8) vary the requirement to wind up the partnership business in cases 
specified in Section 801(4), (5), or (6); 
(10) restrict rights of third parties under this [Act]. 
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the notion "that the agreement of the partners is supreme-unless 
the rights of third parties are involved."lo8 In adopting this policy, 
the drafters of RUPA wanted to create a uniform act that would 
closely imitate what the partners themselves would likely agree to if 
they were to draft their own partnership agreement, yet without the 
necessary expense.109 
Perhaps the most significant change made by RUPA was the 
establishment of two separate and distinct pathways that the part­
nership might take following a partner's withdrawal. l1O Under 
UPA, there existed only the dissolution pathway, which necessarily 
required winding up of the partnership and "suggest[ ed] that the 
partnership business [was] coming to a close when all that [might 
have been] coming to a close [was] one partner's participation."ll1 
In contrast, RUPA acknowledges that a partner's dissociation112 re­
sults in either the dissolution and winding up of the partnership or a 
mandatory buyout of the dissociated partner's interest.113 
In determining whether a mandatory buyout or winding up is 
appropriate under RUPA, partners must first look to section 801, 
which specifies the events causing dissolution and winding up of the 
Id. 
108. Reporters' Overview, supra note 1, at 3; see also UNIF. P'SHIP Acr § 103(a) 
(amended 1997). 	 Section 103(a) of RUPA states: 
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), relations among the partners 
and between the partners and the partnership are governed by the partnership 
agreement. To the extent the partnership agreement does not otherwise pro­
vide, this [Act] governs relations among the partners and between the partners 
and the partnership. 
Id. 
109. Reporters' Overview, supra note 1, at 2-3. 
110. UNIF. P'SHIP Acr § 601 cmt. 1 (amended 1997). 

RUPA dramatically changes the law governing partnership breakups and dis­

solution. An entirely new concept, "dissociation," is used in lieu of the UPA 

term "dissolution" to denote the change in the relationship caused by a part­

ner's ceasing to be associated in the carrying on of the business. "Dissolution" 

is retained, but with a different meaning. 

Id. 
111. Reporters' Overview, supra note 1, at 5. This statement assumes that dissolu­
tion was not wrongful and thus no election under section 38(2)(b) was made. See UNIF. 
P'SHIP Acr § 38(2)(b) (1914),6 U.L.A. 487 (2001) (providing that when dissolution is 
caused in contravention of the partnership agreement, the partners who have not 
caused the dissolution wrongfully may continue the partnership business by unanimous 
vote provided that they compensate the wrongfully dissolving partner for his interest 
pursuant to section 38(2)(c)(II)). 
112. BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 3, § 7.01(b) ("R.U.P.A. clarifies the con­
tinuity of the partnership by providing in § 603 that mere dissociation of a partner 
under § 601 does not necessarily dissolve the partnership under § 801."). 
113. UNIF. P'SHIP Acr § 603 cmt. 1 (amended 1997). 
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partnership business.1l4 Under RUPA, only certain events trigger 
the drastic measure of dissolution and winding Up.llS Among these 
events are notice of a partner's express will to withdraw in an at-will 
partnership116 or a judicial determination that carrying on the part­
nership business is impracticable.117 The Act specifies that "[a]l1 
other dissociations not enumerated in section 801 of RUPA result 
in a mandatory buyout of the partner's interest under Article 7 and 
a continuation of the partnership entity and business by the remain­
ing partners. "118 
The occurrence of an event enumerated in section 801 marks 
the partnership for dissolution, and the partnership then proceeds 
down the winding-up pathway,l19 Dissolution under RUPA, how­
ever, "merely marks the beginning of the winding up process and 
not the termination of the partnership."120 Because of this, part­
ners may unanimously agree at any point after dissolution of the 
partnership, but before winding up is completed, to continue the 
business pursuant to section 802(b ).121 Otherwise, the partnership 
is wound up according to section 807,122 which requires "liquida­
tion" of the partnership assets,l23 Liquidation under RUPA "is de­
114. [d. § 801. 
115. Id. § 801 cmt. 1. 
116. Id. § 801(1). 
117. Id. § 801(5)(iii). 
118. Id. § 801 cmt. 1; see also id. § 603(a) ("If a partner's dissociation results in a 
dissolution and winding up of the partnership business, [Article] 8 applies; otherwise, 
[Article] 7 applies." (alteration in original». 
119. This can be varied by a statement in the partnership agreement regarding the 
procedures for winding up under section 801(1)-(3). See id. § 103(a). However, the 
partnership agreement may not "vary the requirement to wind up the partnership busi­
ness in cases specified in Section 801(4), (5), or (6)." Id. § 103(b)(8). 
120. Reporters' Overview, supra note 1, at 8; see also UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 802 
(amended 1997) (Dissolution does not automatically lead to termination of the partner­
ship because "[a]t any time after the dissolution of a partnership and before the winding 
up of its business is completed, all of the partners ... may waive the right to have the 
partnership business wound up and the partnership terminated."). 
121. Reporters' Overview, supra note 1, at 8. 
122. Section 807 provides in pertinent part: 
(a) In winding up a partnership's business, the assets of the partnership 
... must be applied to discharge its obligations to creditors .... Any surplus 
must be applied to pay in cash the net amount distributable to partners in 
accordance with their right to distributions under subsection (b). 
(b) Each partner is entitled to a settlement of all partnership accounts 
upon winding up the partnership business. In settling accounts among the 
partners, profits and losses that result from the liquidation of the partnership 
assets must be credited and charged to the partners' accounts. 
UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 807 (amended 1997) (emphasis added). 
123. Id.; Reporters' Overview, supra note 1, at 6. 
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rived in part from UPA Sections 38(1) and 40."124 Specifically, 
RUPA continues the "in cash" rule of UPA section 38(1), which 
provides for a partner's right to receive his interest in cash follow­
ing dissolution of the partnership.125 
When the event causing dissociation of a partner is not listed in 
section 801, the partnership proceeds down the pathway providing 
for a buyout of the dissociated partner's interest.126 Specifically, 
section 701 states that a dissociated partner whose dissociation does 
not result in dissolution under section 801 has the right to a buyout 
of the partnership interest by the remaining partners at a price de­
termined by the Act.127 Unless the partnership agreement provides 
otherwise, this buyout is "mandatory,"128 and "the partnership is 
obligated to buyout the dissociating partner['s]" interest.129 The 
default buyout price governed by section 701(b) provides the disso­
ciated partner with the greater of either "the liquidation value or 
the value based on a sale of the entire business as a going concern 
without the dissociated partner."130 The policy behind valuing the 
partnership assets this way is to provide the dissociating partner 
with fair compensation whether the business assets are put up for 
public sale or there is a buyout by the partnership.131 
124. UNIF. P'SHIP Acr § 807 cmt. 1 (amended 1997). 
125. Id. § 807 cmt. 2. 
126. Id. § 701(a). Section 601 expressly provides for events causing dissociation 
but not dissolution and winding up of the partnership. However, a discussion of this 
section is not necessary because a dissociation that does not result in dissolution and 
winding up under section 801 automatically results in a buyout. See id. 
127. Id. 
128. ld. § 701 cmt. 2. Mandatory, as opposed to default, refers to the partners' 
ability to override the rule by providing otherwise in a partnership agreement. See 
supra notes 85, 107-109 and accompanying text. Because of this, the buyout may not be 
considered "mandatory" because section 701 is not listed in section 103(b). See UNIF. 
P'SHIP Acr § 103(b) (amended 1997). For a discussion of whether the buyout is actu­
ally mandatory, see ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIB· 
STEIN ON LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIPS, TIlE REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP 
Acr, AND TIlE UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP Acr (2001) § 8.701 (2008 ed.). 
129. Reporters' Overview, supra note 1, at 11 (emphasis added). Because RUPA 
"obligate[s]" partners to buyout dissociated partners, a determination of whether the 
buyout is "mandatory" is unnecessary. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
130. UNIF. P'SHIP Acr § 701(b) (amended 1997). As explained in the comments 
to section 701, the phrase "[I]iquidation value is not intended to mean distress sale 
value." /d. § 701 cmt. 3. The buyout price is "the price that a willing and informed 
buyer would pay a willing and informed seller, with neither being under any compulsion 
to deal." /d. 
131. Reporters' Overview, supra note 1, at 11-12. 
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Like UPA, RUPA also contains a provision expressly acknowl­
edging the courts' power to use equitable discretion.132 As under 
UPA, rulings based on equitable concerns are common under 
RUPA.133 The statutory language serves as the only limit to the 
courts' equitable discretion.134 That is, a court's ruling based on 
equitable concerns will stand as long as it does not contradict one or 
more provisions of the act.135 
II. THE VARIOUS MEANINGS OF "LIQUIDATION" 
Current confusion under RUPA concerns the definition of "liq­
uidation" used in the dissolution and winding-up pathway. It is 
well-established that a partner who withdraws under one of the 
events listed in section 801 has the right to compel liquidation of an 
at-will partnership's assets in the absence of an agreement.136 How­
ever, it is not clear what Congress intended the term "liquidation" 
to mean because it is not defined in the statute.137 Specifically, 
courts disagree over whether "liquidation" under RUPA necessarily 
requires a forced sale.138 As an alternative to a forced sale, some 
courts construe "liquidation" as synonymous with the "in cash" 
132. See UNIF. P'SHIP Acr § 104(a) (amended 1997) (stating that RUPA is sup­
plemented by the principles of law and equity). 
133. See, e.g., In re Dissolution of Midnight Star Enters., 724 N.W.2d 334 (S.D. 
2006) (holding that majority partners may buyout interest of minority partners where 
majority partners intended to continue the partnership business and had put forth ef­
forts towards an amicable dissolution); Horne v. Aune, 121 P.3d 1227 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2005) (holding that a partner was entitled to buyout the other partner upon dissolution 
of the partnership where the partnership property included the partner's house). 
134. See UNIF. P'SHIP Acr § 104(a) (amended 1997). 
135. See id. ("Unless displaced by particular provisions of this [ActJ, the princi­
ples of law and equity supplement this [Act]."). 
136. See id. § 807; see also Welder v. Green, 985 S.W.2d 170, 177 (Tex. App. 1998) 
("The general rule is that a partner, absent an agreement to the contrary, may dissolve 
the partnership at will ...."). 
137. The comments to RUPA section 701 explain that "[IJiquidation value is not 
intended to mean distress sale value." UNIF. P'SHIP Acr § 701 cmt. 3 (amended 1997). 
Black's Law Dictionary defines "liquidation" as: 
1. The act of determining by agreement or by litigation the exact amount of 
something (as a debt or damages) that before was uncertain. 2. The act of 
settling a debt by payment or other satisfaction. 3. The act or process of con­
verting assets into cash, esp. to settle debts. 
BLACK'S, supra note 7, at 950. This definition arguably encompasses a buyout. For the 
definition of buyout, see supra note 7. 
138. Compare Horne, 121 P.3d at 1234 (holding that "liquidation" under RUPA 
merely guarantees the dissociating partner the right to receive fair value of his interest 
in cash), with McCormick v. Brevig, 96 P.3d 697, 704-05 (Mont. 2004) (holding that 
under RUPA, "liquidation" is synonymous with a forced sale). For the definition of a 
forced sale, see supra note 8. 
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rule.139 Further, there is substantial disagreement over whether the 
term "liquidation" in RUPA section 807 is equivalent to a departing 
partner's right to liquidation under UPA section 38(1), and, if so, 
whether equitable concerns recognized under UPA carry over to 
RUPA. 
A. Liquidation Does Not Mean a "Fire Sale of Assets" 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland, in Creel v. Lilly, held that 
RUPA did not give a departing partner the right to order a "fire 
sale"140 by mandating a forced sale.141 In permitting a buyout, the 
court explained that its goal was "to prevent the disruption and loss 
that are attendant on a forced sale, while at the same time preserv­
ing the right of the deceased partner's estate to be paid his or her 
fair share of the partnership."142 In a rather unique situation, the 
Creel court faced the issue of whether a forced sale was necessary 
for winding up during a phase-in period where UPA and RUPA 
coexisted as Maryland law.143 
In Creel, a three-person partnership operated a NASCAR rac­
ing memorabilia business until the death of one of the partners dis­
solved the partnership.144 Although there was no dispute as to the 
value of the partnership assets, the deceased partner's estate ob­
jected to a buyout that would allow the other two partners to con­
tinue the partnership business.145 The deceased partner's estate 
demanded a forced sale of the partnership assets pursuant to 
UPA.146 
In denying the deceased partner's estate the right to a "fire sale 
of assets" under either RUPA or UPA, the court stated, "[w]inding 
up is not always synonymous with liquidation, which can be a harsh 
and unnecessary measure towards arriving at the true value of the 
business."147 A contrary holding, the court explained, would 
139. See Horne, 121 P.3d at 1234. 
140. A "fire sale" is "[a]ny sale at greatly reduced prices, esp. due to an emer­
gency." BLACK'S, supra note 7, at 1365. The Creel court equated a forced sale with a 
fire sale because of the hurried nature of a forced sale and the reduced prices that 
would occur if the partnership assets were required to be sold to a third party in a 
hUrry. See Creel v. Lilly, 729 A.2d 385, 401-03 (Md. 1999). 
141. See Creel, 729 A.2d at 392. 
142. Id. at 401. 
143. Id. at 387. 
144. Id. at 388-89. 
145. Id. at 389-90. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. at 403. 
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"vest[] excessive power and control in the estate of the deceased 
partner, to the extreme disadvantage of the surviving partners."148 
After describing a forced sale as destructive, the court noted 
RUPA's trend away from the "harsh UPA provision of automatic 
dissolution and compelled liquidation."149 
B. Liquidation Means a Forced Sale 
Traditional notions of liquidation, such as the one adhered to 
by the court in McCormick v. Brevig, equate the term with a forced 
sale. This counter-analysis of liquidation under RUPA maintains 
that because RUPA mitigates the automatic liquidation rule of 
UPA, the common law gloss providing for a buyout option no 
longer applies,150 In McCormick, the Supreme Court of Montana 
held that because of the two distinct tracks available to the exiting 
partner under RUPA, the drafters of RUPA did not intend to allow 
a buyout where partners' actions force them down the dissolution 
pathway.151 McCormick involved a ranching partnership between a 
brother and sister dissolved by judicial decree pursuant to Mon­
tana's version of RUPA section 801,152 
Relying on "the common purpose and plain meaning," the Mc­
Cormick court interpreted "liquidation" to require that partners 
"reduce the partnership assets to cash, pay creditors, and distribute 
to partners the value of their respective interests. "153 Furthermore, 
the court rejected the defendant's argument that the court could 
make use of judicially acceptable alternatives to a forced sale.154 It 
factually distinguished Creel because Creel involved the death of a 
partner (as opposed to a court-ordered dissolution); thus, dissocia­
tion of the partnership was not governed by RUPA section 801,155 
Instead, Article 7 governed the dissociation and buyout pathway.156 
In the case of a court-ordered dissolution, the court explained, "the 
148. Id. at 402. 
149. Id. at 392. 
150. BROMBERG & RiBSTEIN, supra note 3, § 7.11(f). 
151. McCormick v. Brevig, 96 P.3d 697, 703 (Mont. 2004) ("[T]he only possible 
result under RUPA was for the partnership assets to be liquidated and the proceeds 
distributed between the partners proportionately."). 
152. Id. at 700-01. 
153. Id. at 704. 
154. Id. at 704-05. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. at 703; see also UNIF. P'SHIP Acr § 601 (amended 1997),6 U.L.A. 163 
(2001). 
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partnership assets necessarily must be reduced to cash ...."157 As 
a result, McCormick held that a forced sale was a "statutorily man­
dated requirement" of RUPA dissolution.158 
The Supreme Court of Montana reaffirmed its refusal to allow 
a buyout under RUPA in Pankratz Farms, Inc. v. Pankratz .159 The 
facts of Pankratz involved a partner's request for judicial dissolu­
tion of a farming partnership.160 At trial the district court found 
that although dissolution and winding up was proper based on the 
circumstances, a forced sale of the partnership's assets would have 
significant adverse tax consequences for all partners, including the 
partner requesting judicial dissolution.161 In light of the negative 
tax consequences and the desire of the remaining partners to con­
tinue the business, the district court ordered the remaining partners 
to purchase the dissolving partner's interest.162 On appeal, the re­
maining partners further argued that a buyout was proper since the 
departing partner requested monetary damages as an alternative to 
dissolution.163 
Despite the negative tax consequences and alternative request, 
the court refused to deviate from its commitment to require a 
forced sale. l64 Relying on McCormick, the court explained that in 
every case the statute "require[s] liquidation of the partnership as­
sets through a forced sale, and distribution of the net surplus in 
cash to the partners. "165 
C. Liquidation Means the "In Cash" Rule 
Liquidation under RUPA has also been interpreted to guaran­
tee partners the right to receive the fair value of their partnership 
interest in cash upon dissolution and winding Up166 by means other 
than a forced sale.167 In Horne v. Aune, the Court of Appeals of 
Washington based its holding on three underlying principles: (1) 
157. McCormick, 96 P.3d at 705 (emphasis added). 
158. Id. 
159. Pankratz Farms, Inc. v. Pankratz, 95 P.3d 671, 681 (Mont. 2003). 
160. Id. at 678. 
161. Id. at 679. 
162. See id. 
163. Id. at 680. 
164. See id. at 679-81. 
165. Id. at 680. 
166. This is the "in cash" rule elucidated under UPA section 38. See UNIF. P'SHIP 
Acr § 807 cmt. 2 (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 207 (2001) (explaining that the "in cash" 
rule of UPA section 38 carries to RUPA section 807). For a discussion of the "in cash" 
rule under UPA, see supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text. 
167. See Horne v. Aune, 121 P.3d 1227, 1233-34 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005). 
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that the statutory language of RUPA section 807 amounted to the 
"in cash" rule; (2) that RUPA did not change UPA's procedures for 
winding up; and (3) that the court had equitable discretion at its 
disposal.168 
In interpreting the statutory language, the Horne court found 
that the statute only guaranteed the partners the right to receive 
their interests in cash-not to compel a forced sale.169 The court 
acknowledged that this result could be achieved by means other 
than a forced sale and still comply with the statute.170 The language 
did not extend to preclude a buyout. Part of the court's reasoning 
for this interpretation of the statutory language, however, came 
from analogy to cases interpreting UPA.171 
In adopting the "in cash" rule, the court in Horne embraced 
the analysis of Creel despite factual distinctions between the two 
cases.172 While the dissociation in Creel was triggered by the death 
of a partner and was thus subject to both UPA and RUPA,173 
Horne involved a suit for judicial dissolution and winding up solely 
under RUPA.174 The court failed to distinguish Creel despite the 
fact that death is not among those events listed in RUPA section 
801, and, therefore, by default, leads to the pathway for dissociation 
and buyout.175 The court acknowledged that RUPA provided for 
two distinct pathways: one for a buyout and another for winding up 
of the partnership.176 The court insisted, however, that "when part­
ners choose the path of dissolution and winding up, the procedures 
are substantially the same under RUPA as they were under 
UPA."177 
Horne's analysis was consistent with Creel in relying on equita­
ble considerations present under both RUPA and UPA to reach its 
result. After acknowledging that "winding up generally has been 
equated with the forced sale of partnership assets," the court ratio­
nalized the association between winding up and a forced sale as a 
matter of convenience since a forced sale was historically seen as 
the most accurate way to ensure fair market value for partnership 
168. Id. at 1234. 
169. Id. 
170. Id. 
171. See id. at 1233-34 (embracing the rationale of Creel, a pre-RUPA case). 
172. See id. For an analysis of Creel, see discussion supra Part II.A. 
173. See Creel v. Lilly, 729 A.2d 385, 403 (Md. 1999). 
174. Horne, 121 P.3d at 1231. 
175. Compare Horne, 121 P.3d 1227, with Creel, 729 A.2d 385. 
176. Horne, 121 P.3d at 123l. 
177. Id. 
819 2009] BREAKING UP (OR BREAKING OFF) IS HARD TO DO 
assets.178 The court then determined that winding up was not re­
quired by the statute, citing examples of cases that had adopted al­
ternatives to winding up under UPA when the value of the assets 
was known.179 In concluding that RUPA does not require a forced 
sale, the court reasoned that "[a]lthough the court's equitable dis­
cretion is subject to partnership statutes, RUPA does not do away 
altogether with equitable considerations" present under UPA.180 
III. 	 DISSOLUTION UNDER RUPA DOES NOT REQUIRE A 
FORCED SALE 
RUPA's use of the word "liquidation" in section 807 does not 
mandate a forced sale. Rather, under the plain language approach, 
"liquidation" is synonymous with the "in cash" rule. However, 
even if the plain language of section 807 is ignored, it is indisputable 
that the term "liquidation" is ambiguous as used in the act. As 
such, the court may use its equitable discretion to permit a buyout. 
A. The Plain Language Argument 
1. The Statutory Language Does Not Define Liquidation 
The statutory language of RUPA does not require a forced sale 
upon winding up. Instead, it merely requires that partners receive 
their interest in cash.t81 Section 807(a) states that, upon winding up 
the partnership, the partnership assets "must be applied to dis­
charge its obligations to creditors," and "[a]ny surplus must be ap­
plied to pay in cash the net amount distributable to partners in 
accordance with their right to distributions under subsection 
(b)."182 No specific language requires the reduction of assets to 
cash, as long as accounts with creditors are settled and partners re­
ceive cash for their interests.183 Furthermore, this cash requirement 
applies only to partners and does not preclude creditors from re­
ceiving their interests in kind.184 Thus, a partner who can settle all 
178. Id. at 1233-34. 
179. For support, the court cited cases governed by UPA in which equitable con­
cerns, such as economic waste, mandated partition in kind or a buyout. See id. at 1233 
(citing Logoluso v. Logoluso, 43 Cal. Rptr. 678, 682 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Nicholes 
v. Hunt, 541 P.2d 820 (Or. 1975». In Horne, the parties stipulated to the value of the 
partnership assets. Id. at 1234 n.5. 
180. Id. at 1234. 
181. See UNIF. P'SHIP Acr § 807(a) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 207 (2001). 
182. Id. (emphasis added). 
183. See id. 
184. ROBERT W. HILLMAN ET AL., THE REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP Acr 
§ 807 authors' comments (2003); see also UNIF. P'SHIP Acr § 807(a) & cmt. 2 (amended 
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outstanding obligations on the partnership property and provide 
the other partners with their respective interests in cash is entitled 
to receipt of the partnership property upon winding Up.18S 
Although the plain language of RUPA does not necessarily re­
quire a forced sale, it does confer on partners the right to compel 
liquidation of the partnership assets.186 Subsection (b) of section 
807 provides for the settlement rights of each partner upon winding 
Up.187 Specifically, when settling accounts among partners, the stat­
ute provides that "profits and losses that result from the liquidation 
of the partnership assets must be credited and charged to the part­
ners' accounts."188 However, the statute does not define liquid a­
tion.189 Instead, when subsection (a) is read in conjunction with 
subsection (b), two competing definitions of liquidation give rise to 
different interpretations of the statute.190 
The first possibility is to define liquidation as a forced sale.191 
This interpretation suggests that a partner who pays creditors and 
other partners their respective interests in cash is entitled to receipt 
of the partnership property upon winding up unless the other part­
ners exercise their right to compel a forced sale of the partnership 
assets.192 If, however, partners fail to exercise the right to a forced 
sale, they may be bought out. Thus, a forced sale is not required in 
every instance; it is only required where the right is exercised. The 
other possible interpretation is that liquidation is synonymous with 
the "in cash" rule.193 Under this interpretation, a partner who pays 
creditors and other partners their respective interests in cash is enti­
tled to receipt of the partnership property upon winding up even 
when partners exercise their liquidation right.194 The "in cash" in­
1997), 6 U.L.A. 206-07 (2001) ("[T]he partnership assets must first be applied to dis­
charge partnership liabilities to creditors .... After ... , any surplus must be applied to 
pay in cash the net amount due the partners ...."). 
185. See UNIF. P'SHIP Acr § 807(a) (amended 1997); see also In re Dissolution of 
Midnight Star Enters., 724 N.W.2d 334, 341 (S.D. 2006) ("Instead of ordering the ma­
jority partners to purchase the whole partnership for the appraised value, the majority 
partners should only be required to pay any interests the withdrawing partner is due."). 
186. See UNIF. P'SHIP Acr § 807(b) (amended 1997). 
187. See id. § 807(a)-(b). 
188. Id. § 807(b) (emphasis added). 
189. See id. § 807 (a)-(b). For an explanation of what liquidation does not entail 
under the statute, see supra note 137. 
190. UNIF. P'SHIP Acr § 807(a)-(b) (amended 1997). 
191. See McCormick v. Brevig, 96 P.3d 697, 705 (Mont. 2004) (holding that under 
RUPA, liquidation requires a forced sale). 
192. See UNIF. P'SHIP Acr § 807(a)-(b) (amended 1997). 
193. See Home v. Aune, 121 P.3d 1227 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005). 
194. See UNIF. P'SHIP Acr § 807(a)-(b) (amended 1997). 
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terpretation merely equates the liquidation right with the right to 
refuse an in-kind distribution. 
2. 	 McCormick v. Brevig: A Mechanical Misreading of the 
Statute 
In McCormick v. Brevig, the Supreme Court of Montana's in­
terpretation of liquidation as requiring a forced sale was purport­
edly based on the plain language of sections 807(a) and (b).195 
After interpreting the language of the statute, the court concluded 
that the meaning of liquidation was "to reduce the partnership assets 
to cash, pay creditors, and distribute to partners the value of their 
respective interest. "196 
There are three problems with the McCormick definition of 
liquidation. First, the order of proceedings, which requires reduc­
tion of the assets to cash before creditors and partners are paid, has 
no basis in the statutory language.197 Second, even if liquidation 
requires first reducing the partnership assets to cash, such a defini­
tion does not preclude a court-supervised buyout by one of the 
partners. Third, the court failed to address why the definition of 
liquidation under RUPA was different from that under UPA even 
though the statutory language that served as the basis for the liqui­
dation right remained the same.198 
The statutory language does not require reducing the partner­
ship assets to cash before creditors are paid and partners' interests 
are allocated. The statute only requires that the assets be applied 
and that the partners receive their interest in cash.t99 The "in cash" 
requirement of the statute applies only to partners and not to credi­
tors. If the statute required reducing the assets to cash first, then 
creditors would also have the right to receive their interest in cash. 
195. See McCormick, 96 P.3d at 704 (interpreting MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-10­
629(1)-(2), Montana's codified version of UNIF. P'SHIP Acr § 807(a)-(b) (amended 
1997». 
196. Id. at 704 (emphasis added). 
197. See UNIF. P'SHIP Acr § 807(a)-(b) (amended 1997) (requiring that partners 
receive their interest in cash but not requiring that creditors receive their interest in 
cash). If, in fact, liquidation of partnership assets is required by the statute, it would be 
required only after creditors are paid in cash or in kind. That is, first creditors receive 
their interest in cash or in kind. Then, any surplus partnership assets are reduced to 
cash. Lastly, the surplus is divided among the partners. See id.; see also id. § 807 cmt. 2 
(mentioning the "in cash" rule only with regard to the partners' distributions). 
198. See McCormick, 96 P.3d at 704-05 (distinguishing Creel, which held that liq­
uidation under UPA and RUPA did not require a forced sale, either legally or 
factually). 
199. See UNIF. P'SHIP Acr § 807 (a)-(b) (amended 1997). 
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But since creditors are not granted this right, if reduction of the 
assets to cash is required at all by the statute, reduction must take 
place following settlements with creditors. However, if the McCor­
mick definition were adopted, it would necessitate reduction of the 
assets to cash before creditors are paid, which is in contravention of 
the plain language of section 807. 
Furthermore, McCormick's definition of liquidation sought to 
reconcile subsections (a) and (b) of the statute in such a way that 
yielded an irrational reading of the statutory language. McCormick 
defined liquidation, which appeared in subsection (b) of the statute, 
by loosely relying on language appearing in subsection (a). A care­
ful reading of the statute gives two possible interpretations that rec­
oncile subsections (a) and (b).200 However, the McCormick court's 
definition was inharmonious with both interpretations. 
The McCormick court's interpretation of liquidation as requir­
ing a forced sale does not support either reasonable interpretation 
of the statute. McCormick essentially ruled that a partner who pays 
creditors and other partners their respective interests in cash is 
never entitled to receipt of the partnership property upon winding 
up under subsection (a), even if partners fail to exercise the right to 
compel liquidation of the partnership assets under subsection (b). 
The Supreme Court of Montana's decision in Pankratz Farms, Inc. 
v. Pankratz further confirmed its staunch position that a forced sale 
would always be required under the statute even if partners alterna­
tively request monetary damages.201 This interpretation is inconsis­
tent with subsection (a), the two possible interpretations of the 
statute based on the two definitions of liquidation, the comments to 
section 807, and other provisions of RUPA.202 
The McCormick court failed to explain why a buyout was not 
within the court's definition of liquidation. Certainly a buyout by 
one partner, who provides other partners with their respective in­
terests in cash, satisfies the court's requirement of first reducing the 
assets to cash.203 In McCormick, the lower court's analysis of the 
200. For an explanation of the two possible interpretations, see discussion supra 
notes 189-194 and accompanying text. 
201. Pankratz Farms, Inc. v. Pankratz, 95 P.3d 671, 680 (Mont. 2004). 
202. See UNIF. P'SHIP Acr § 103(b)(8) (amended 1997) (implying that section 807 
is a default provision that comes into play only in the absence of a contrary agreement 
between the partners); id. § 802(b)(1) (providing that any time before completion of 
the winding-up phase, partners may decide to continue the partnership business by a 
majority vote). 
203. The only difference between a forced sale and a buyout rests on the legal 
rights of the parties under the circumstances. Ribstein, supra note 61, at 375. In a 
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statute also began with the plain-meaning approach. After looking 
at the plain language of the statute, the district court determined 
that section 807 required liquidation of the partnership assets and 
division of the proceeds between the two partners.204 However, 
upon finding no clear definition of the term "liquidate" in the stat­
ute itself, the court adopted the Black's definition, "to assemble 
and mobilize the assets, settle with the creditors and debtors and 
apportion the remaining assets, if any, among the stockholders or 
owners. "205 
Relying on the plain-language approach, the Supreme Court of 
Montana rejected the lower court's conclusion that a buyout was 
within the definition of liquidation.206 Instead of acknowledging 
the ambiguous definition of liquidation or the possibility that the 
lower court's remedy fell squarely within the definition articulated 
by the court, the court stated that a buyout was a "judicially created 
alternative to [the] statutorily mandated requirement" of a forced 
sale.207 
The McCormick court failed to recognize that "liquidation" 
has substantially the same meaning under RUPA and UPA. The 
statutory language held to require liquidation under UPA is nearly 
identical to that of RUPA.208 Thus, the same liquidation right that 
was once given to all withdrawing partners under UPA carries over 
to partners undergoing dissolution and winding up under RUPA.209 
buyout, a former partner has the advantage of buying the partnership business at fair 
market value or a judicially determined price. Id. In contrast, a forced sale involves a 
sale of the partnership assets at auction where neither party receives first option to buy. 
Id. at 367-68. 
204. McCormick v. Brevig, 96 P.3d 697, 703 (Mont. 2004). 
205. Id. at 703-04 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DlcrIONARY 930 (6th ed. 1990». Note 
that McCormick relied on the definition of the word "liquidate" and not "liquidation." 
See supra note 137 for the definition of "liquidation." 
206. See McCormick, 96 P.3d at 703-04 (rejecting the lower court's analysis, 
which recognized that" 'liquidate' had a variety of possible meanings," including a judi­
cially mandated buyout). 
207. Id. at 705. 
208. Compare UNIF. P'SHIP Acr § 807(a) (amended 1997),6 U.L.A. 206 (2001) 
(explaining that winding up under RUPA requires "the assets of the partnership ... [to] 
be applied to discharge its obligations to creditors" and "[a]ny surplus [to] be applied to 
pay in cash the net amount distributable to partners" (emphasis added», with UNIF. 
P'SlflP Acr § 38(1) (1914), 6 V.L.A. 487 (2001) (explaining that upon dissolution, the 
partners "may have the partnership property applied to discharge its liabilities, and the 
surplus applied to pay in cash the net amount owing to the respective partners" (em­
phasis added». 
209. See Larry E. Ribstein, The Revised Uniform Partnership Act: Not Ready for 
Prime Time, 49 Bus. LAW. 45, 62 (1994). 
824 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:797 
The defendant, who urged the court to follow Creel v. Lilly,2l0 
made this very argument.211 Nevertheless, the court rejected Creel 
altogether, stating that it was "both legally and factually distinguish­
able."212 Although the court correctly distinguished Creel's analysis 
of dissociation under RUPA, it failed to recognize that the revision 
had not changed the language conferring a right of liquidation or 
the definition of liquidation itself.213 
B. 	 A Buyout in One Instance Does Not Preclude Its Use in 
Another: Why the Negative Implication Argument Fails 
Challengers to the statutory interpretation that liquidation 
means the "in cash" rule chiefly base their argument on the struc­
ture of RUPA's dissociation provisions. These opponents argue 
that since RUPA provides one path for a buyout and another path 
for liquidation, the two pathways are mutually exclusive.214 By in­
cluding a separate path for buyout, the drafters, by negative impli­
cation, must not have intended for liquidation to encompass a 
buyout. Likewise, since the drafters of RUPA mitigated the harsh 
liquidation provision of UPA, the common law gloss215 does not 
carry over to RUPA.216 
The argument that the common law gloss does not carry over 
to RUPA is without merit. Aside from the similarities in the lan­
guage of the winding-up provisions of UPA and RUPA, requiring 
only that payment of a partnership interest be in cash, the statutory 
language expressly provides for the use of a court's equitable dis­
cretion to supplement the act.217 Furthermore, it cannot be said 
[RUPA's] structural changes hide the fundamental similarity between RUPA 
and UPA: under both, a single partner can compel liquidation of the firm at 
any time. The only significant difference between the approaches of the two 
acts is that, under RUPA, a partnership does not necessarily "dissolve" as a 
result of a partner's dissociation. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
210. 	 Creel v. Lilly, 729 A.2d 385 (Md. 1999). 
211. 	 McCormick, 96 P.3d at 704; see also supra Part II.A for a discussion of Creel. 
212. 	 McCormick, 96 P.3d at 705. 
213. 	 See id. at 704-05. 
214. See generally UNIF. P'SHIP Acr §§ 701, 801, 807 (amended 1997),6 U.L.A. 
175-76,189-90,206 (2001). 
215. The "common law gloss" refers to the court's allowance of a buyout to avoid 
the inequities of a forced sale. For a discussion of the common law gloss, see supra note 
10 and accompanying text. 
216. 	 See BROMBERG & RiBSTEIN, supra note 3, § 7.11(f). 
217. See UNlF. P'SHIP Acr § 104(a) (amended 1997) (acknowledging that the 
court may use the principles of equity and law to supplement this Act); see also UNIF. 
P'SHIP Acr § 5 (1914), 6 U.L.A. 391 (2001) (same). 
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that RUPA's move to separate dissociation events into two path­
ways eliminated every possible equitable concern existing under 
UPA.218 
For example, if liquidation requires a forced sale, RUPA's 
structural changes would provide little benefit in the following situ­
ation: Partners A and B bought a residence as partnership property. 
The two partners each contributed equally to the down payment of 
the property and obtained joint financing for the balance. Solely 
due to Partner A's conduct, the partnership suffered, and Partner B 
took possession of the property. After Partner B assumed all ex­
penses and obligations related to the property for a period of 
months, Partner A sought judicial dissolution and winding up of the 
partnership. Partner B requested that the court order the sale of 
the property. She also requested that the court give her an option 
to purchase the property. In mediation, both partners stipulated as 
to the property's fair market value and agreed that it would be in 
the best interest of the parties for one party to buy the property 
instead of offering it at public sale. However, they disagreed about 
who should be allowed to purchase the property. Administrative 
costs associated with a public sale were estimated to cost as much as 
twelve percent of the property's value.219 
Interpreting RUPA to obviate UPA's equitable considerations 
and require a forced sale in this case would result in economic 
waste and a significant injustice to Partner B. This was clearly not 
what the legislature intended by trying to remedy the UPA's inequi­
ties in RUPA.220 As such, if liquidation is interpreted as a forced 
sale, the common law gloss must exist in order to avoid these ineq­
uitable outcomes. 
The negative implication argument fails in this context for one 
simple reason: the buyout under the dissociation pathway is 
218. See, e.g., In re Dissolution of Midnight Star Enters., 724 N.W.2d 334 (S.D. 
2006) (allowing majority partners to buyout interests of minority partners where major­
ity partners sought to continue the business and had unsuccessfully attempted an amica­
ble dissolution). 
219. The fact pattern described is loosely based on Horne. See Horne v. Aune, 
121 P.3d 1227, 1228-30 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005). 
220. See UNIF. P'SHIP Acr § 801 cmt. 1 (amended 1997) ("RUPA's move to the 
entity theory is driven in part by the need to prevent a technical dissolution or its conse­
quences.); see also Committee Report, supra note 27, at 125 (making recommendations 
that would soften the rules to prevent a technical dissolution, including authorizing the 
court to order remedies other than dissolution in a dissolution suit). 
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mandatory.221 With this in mind, the negative implication argument 
is only effective to the extent that, because the legislature provides 
one track for a mandatory buyout and another track for liquidation, 
the drafters did not intend for liquidation to include a mandatory 
buyout. However, exclusion of a mandatory buyout from the 
meaning of liquidation does not prohibit a voluntary or court­
ordered buyout from the scope of the definition of liquidation. 
C. 	 The Equitable Discretion Approach: The Arguments Against a 
Mechanical Misreading of the Statute 
1. 	 Looking Out for the Best Interests of the Partnership 
If the plain language of the statute is not held to connote liqui­
dation as the "in cash" rule, then the term must be construed as 
ambiguous.222 As such, a court may use equitable discretion to find 
judicially created alternatives to a forced sale. RUPA specifically 
authorizes a court's use of equitable discretion by stating that 
"[u]nless displaced by particular provisions of this [act], the princi­
ples of law and equity supplement this [act]."223 This provision pro­
vides statutory support for courts to consider judicial alternatives to 
RUPA's black-letter law where appropriate. Such alternatives are 
particularly appropriate where, as in winding up a partnership busi­
ness, a certain interpretation of the statute may negatively affect all 
partners.224 Likewise, the court's equitable discretion is required to 
avoid a situation where a partner may purchase the partnership 
business at public auction for an unfairly low price.225 Such a result 
is likely where the court requires a forced sale upon dissolution of 
221. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 701 cmt. 2 (amended 1997) (stating that the buyout in 
section 701 is mandatory, but may be fulfilled by other partners or a third party); see 
also id. § 701(a) (stating that a dissociated partner not dissociated under section 801 has 
the right to a buyout of the partnership business). 
222. The statute does not specifically define liquidation. See id. § 807. Further­
more, no legislative history directly addresses this precise issue. 
223. 	 [d. § l04(a). 
224. The substantial financial costs attributed to a forced sale sometimes consti­
tute economic waste. See Disotell v. Stiltner, 100 P.3d 890 (Alaska 2004) (holding that 
a buyout was appropriate where transactions of a forced sale totaled twelve percent of 
the property's value). Even if transaction costs of a forced sale do not amount to eco­
nomic waste, they nonetheless subtract from the value of the partnership interest. 
225. Cf Prentiss v. Sheffel, 513 P.2d 949, 953 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973) (holding that 
in order to increase the amount realized from a sale, partners are permitted to bid at a 
judicial sale of partnership assets). 
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the partnership and one party is better-off financially than the 
other.226 
Aside from the possibility of one partner having the upper 
hand, courts must also consider the facts under the equitable ap­
proach. For instance, the court may take into account whether the 
partnership property served as the residence of one of the part­
ners;227 whether one partner developed the business;228 whether a 
forced sale would likely cause hardship to one partner;229 and 
whether one partner's actions caused harm to the partnership.230 
Under an equitable approach, the court reaches a decision based on 
the best interests of the parties while remaining true to the lan­
guage of the statute. 
2. 	 Horne v. Aune: The "Equity Supplements the Statute" 
Approach 
In Horne v. Aune, the court's conclusion that "liquidation" 
means the "in cash" rule was based on the court's equitable discre­
tion and the partners' stipulation concerning the value of the part­
nership property.231 The court enumerated both common law and 
statutory support for use of its equitable discretion when deciding 
whether the statute required a forced sale. In the beginning of the 
analysis, the court stated that, since the adoption of UPA, "the 
court's equitable discretion has been subject to partner statutes."232 
As long as the court's judgment does not directly contradict the 
statute, the court is free to make a decision based on whatever equi­
table concerns it chooses. The court gave further support for this 
assertion by pointing to section l04(a) of RUPA, which expressly 
allows for the court to supplement RUPA's provisions with equita­
ble principles.233 
226. Cf Page v. Page, 359 P.2d 41 (Cal. 1961). Page involved a wealthy partner 
who was accused of winding up the partnership before a co-partner could recover his 
investment. See id. at 42. The court explained that a partner may not freeze out a co­
partner and exploit the partnership business for his own use. See id. at 44. 
227. See Disotell, 100 P.3d 890; Home v. Aune, 121 P.3d 1227 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2005). 
228. See Creel v. Lilly, 729 A.2d 385 (Md. 1999). 
229. See BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 3, § 7.11(f) (noting the likelihood 
that an unforeseen death of a partner would result in hardship to the partnership). 
230. See Horne, 121 P.3d at 1229. 
231. Id. at 1234. 
232. Id. at 1231. 
233. Id. at 1234 (quoting WASH. REv. CODE § 25.05.020(1) (1998), Washington's 
codified version of section 104 of RUPA). 
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Allowing a court to supplement the statute with equitable prin­
ciples provides the court some discretion; however, such a state­
ment still requires the court to interpret the statute. This statutory 
interpretation serves as the only limit to the court's equitable dis­
cretion; that is, the court may do everything but directly contradict 
the statute. In Horne, the court examined the statute by first look­
ing at the plain language, which the court determined only required 
that upon winding up of the partnership the partners receive their 
interest in cash.234 The court explained that a partner could receive 
his interest in cash "by means other than forced sale."235 In support 
of this analysis, the court relied heavily on cases that interpreted 
UPA's winding-up provision instead of RUPA's winding-up provi­
sion.236 As justification for the use of pre-RUPA cases, the court 
reasoned that "when partners choose the path of dissolution and 
winding up, the procedures are substantially the same under RUPA 
as they were under UPA."237 In examining the case law, the court 
mentioned several equitable factors that would support the inter­
pretation that the statute did not compel a forced sale. These fac­
tors included: (1) the prospect of economic waste; (2) the inability 
to obtain fair value for the partnership interest at public auction; (3) 
the residential nature of the partnership property;238 and (4) stipu­
lation as to the value of the partnership property.239 So long as the 
court interpreted the statute in a way that still required payment to 
partners in cash upon winding up, the court's judgment was consis­
tent with the winding up statute. 
The court went on to qualify times when the statute should be 
interpreted to require a forced sale. Specifically, the court left open 
the prospect of a forced sale when there is "a valid dispute concern­
ing the value of the partnership property."240 The court's reasoning 
for this qualification was based on the historical precedent that 
forced sales were considered "the most accurate method of valuing 
partnership assets. "241 
234. Id. 
235. [d. 
236. See id. at 1231-34 (citing Disotell v. Stiltner, 100 P.3d 890 (Alaska 2004); 
Logoluso v. Logoluso, 43 Cal. Rptr. 678 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Creel v. Lilly, 729 
A.2d 385 (Md. 1999); Nicholes v. Hunt, 541 P.2d 820 (Or. 1975); Guntle v. Barnett, 871 
P.2d 627 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994». 
237. [d. at 1231. 
238. See id. at 1233 (citing Disotell, 100 P.3d 890). 
239. See id. (citing Creel, 729 A.2d 385). 
240. ld. at 1234. 
241. /d. 
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Although Horne was correct to rely on its equitable discretion 
to permit a buyout, there are three problems with the court's over­
all approach. First, the court did not explain why the procedures 
for winding up were substantially the same under RUPA and UPA. 
Second, the court inappropriately relied on cases interpreting UPA. 
Third, the court could have-and should have-reached its holding 
without qualifying the language of the statute to require a forced 
sale when a valid dispute about the partnership property exists. 
The procedures for winding up are substantially the same 
under RUPA and UPA due to the statutory language.242 The 
Horne court failed to recognize this, citing only RUPA's winding-up 
provision and repeatedly stating that the two statutes provide for 
the same procedures.243 A direct comparison of the statutory lan­
guage would have made the court's analysis less confusing and 
more persuasive.244 Furthermore, the court could have used the 
fact of the similar statutory language as support for similar equita­
ble considerations. That is, the same equitable considerations 
under UPA hold under RUPA because the statutory language and 
the revisions did not do away with them. 
The Horne court's reliance on pre-RUPA holdings, particularly 
Creel v. Lilly, was misplaced. The court cited Creel as its main sup­
port for the proposition that winding up does not equal a forced 
sale.245 Although Creel was decided based in part on RUPA,246 its 
facts were distinguishable from those of Horne due to the nature of 
the event (the death of a partner) that caused dissociation in 
Creel.247 Under RUPA, the death of a partner would trigger a 
mandatory buyout of the partnership interest and not liquida­
tion.248 In contrast, a court-ordered dissolution, as in Horne, would 
proceed down the path for dissolution and winding up under 
RUPA.249 The current controversy, and the issue in Horne, in­
volves not the mandatory buyout pathway but the definition of liq­
242. See supra notes 15, 22, 209 and accompanying text. 
243. See Horne, 121 P.3d at 1231-32 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 25.05.330 
(1998), Washington's codified version of section 807 of RUPA). 
244. See supra note 208 for a direct comparison of the statutory language. 
245. See Horne, 121 P.3d at 1233-34 (citing Creel v. Lilly, 729 A.2d 385 (Md. 
1999)). 
246. At the time of the case, Maryland law included both UPA and RUPA be­
cause of the introduction of RUPA to the legislature. See Creel, 729 A.2d at 387. 
247. Compare id. at 389 (dissociation caused by the death of a partner), with 
Horne, 121 P.3d at 1230 (partner sought court-ordered dissolution). 
248. See UNIF. P'SHIP Acr § 701 (amended 1997),6 U.L.A 175 (2001). 
249. See id. §§ 801, 807. 
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uidation in the dissolution and winding-up pathway. As such, the 
holding in Creel is distinguishable and should have had no bearing 
on the Horne court's decision. 
Finally, it was unnecessary for the Horne court to expressly ac­
knowledge the merits of a forced sale when partners dispute the 
value of the partnership property.250 The court could have reached 
its conclusion based only on its equitable discretion and the inter­
pretation of the statute as not requiring a forced sale.251 The impli­
cation that the statute requires a forced sale when there is a dispute 
about the value of the partnership property only serves to weaken 
the court's argument. This proposition is particularly true under 
current practices where the judge has the power to employ other 
ways to determine the asset's value, such as a court-ordered ap­
praisal of the partnership property. Moreover, by repeatedly em­
phasizing the importance of the court's equitable discretion, the 
court leaves the door open for later decisions to order a forced sale 
when principles of law and equity require one-for example, where 
there is a dispute concerning the partnership property's value.252 
But by essentially stating that a forced sale is required when the 
partnership property's value is in dispute, the court is actually limit­
ing equitable discretion in future cases.253 
Thus, although Horne was correct to rely on its equitable dis­
cretion under Washington's codified version of RUPA section 
104(a), the court's reasoning would have been more effective had it 
compared the statutory language of RUPA and UPA dissolution; 
declined to qualify the buyout option; and rebutted, instead of sim­
ply rejecting, the McCormick court's reasoning. 
CONCLUSION 
RUPA does not require a forced sale. The statutory language 
only provides that, upon dissolution and winding up, partners must 
receive their interest payable in cash. Under section 807, a part­
250. See Horne, 121 P.3d at 1234. 
251. See UNIF. P'SHIP Acr § 104(a) (amended 1997). 
252. See Horne, 121 P.3d at 1234 ("Absent a valid dispute concerning the value of 
the partnership property, [a partner] has no legal right, under the winding-up statute, to 
force the public sale of partnership assets."). Based on the court's statement, by nega­
tive implication it would follow that where there is a valid dispute concerning the value 
of the partnership property, the partner would have a legal right, under the winding-up 
statute, to force the public sale of partnership assets. See id. 
253. See id. (recognizing that a forced sale may be appropriate where there is a 
dispute as to the value of the partnership property before concluding that no forced sale 
was required based on equitable discretion). 
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ner's "liquidation" right upon winding up of the partnership is lim­
ited to a right to refuse distribution in kind. This interpretation is 
supported by nearly identical language in UPA, which permits judi­
cially created alternatives to a forced sale upon dissolution and 
winding up of the partnership, so long as cash is the method of pay­
ment to the partners.254 The court in McCormick incorrectly con­
strued the statute to require a forced sale even if partners fail to 
request a public sale.255 Adopting this interpretation effectively 
turns the liquidation right into a necessity despite decisions by part­
ners to the contrary. Furthermore, it conflicts with the entity the­
ory of RUPA, which gives remaining partners the option of 
continuing the partnership following the departure of a partner. 
Likewise, the statutory scheme of RUPA's breakup provisions 
does not preclude a buyout and require a forced sale. By providing 
that certain dissolution-causing events gave rise to a mandatory 
buyout, the legislature did not prohibit voluntary buyouts upon 
winding up and dissolution of the partnership. Instead, RUPA's 
statutory scheme was intended to incorporate the entity theory and 
correct some of the prevailing inequities existing under UPA. Be­
cause RUPA did not mend every possible inequity, the drafters 
must have intended for courts to permit a buyout when they saw fit, 
even in the face of dissolution. 
By providing that courts may supplement the statute with the 
principles of law and equity, RUPA implicitly authorizes courts to 
order a buyout when a partnership is marked for dissolution and 
winding up. Because the statute does not provide a definition of 
"liquidation," courts may use any definition, provided it does not 
contravene the statute. Since the statute only requires payment to 
partners in cash, a court's allowance of a buyout is in harmony with 
the statute. Accordingly, because the allowance for a buyout under 
RUPA may come from the statutory language, the entity theory, 
the statutory scheme, or the principles of equity, it follows that dis­
solution under RUPA does not require a forced sale. 
Tiffany A. Hixson 
254. See UNIF. P'SHIP Acr § 38(1) (1914), 6 U.L.A. 487 (2001); see also id. § 38 
cmt.; Guntle v. Barnett, 871 P.2d 627, 632 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994). 
255. See McCormick v. Brevig, 96 PJd 697, 705 (Mont. 2004). 
